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COMMENTS
FROM WHAT TIME DOES A WILL "SPEAK"?
A recent Iowa case raises interesting questions as to the con-
struction of a will. The testator provided in his will that, on his
death, his executors shoull convert all his property, both real and
personal, into money, pay his debts and give to his wife one third of
the residue. The remainder was to be distributed equally among his
children. At the time of the execution of the will testator's principal
property consisted of farm and city realty. Subsequently, he and his
wife sold the farm land, but not the city property. The wife died
first. Within a few months testator died without having altered the
will. The testator's children insisted that the devise to the wife had
lapsed, but a child of the wife by a former marriage, a stranger to
testator's blood, claimed his mother's share under the Iowa Code.'
The basis of plaintiff's (testator's children) claim lay in the propo-
sition that a devise identical with what the law would allow the
devisee lapses, and the beneficiary takes the "worthier title" which the
law affords. This is the law in Iowa.2  But defendant (deceased
wife's son) insists that since the wife is entitled to one-third of the
'IOWA CODE, 1924, 11861.2 Tennant v. Smith, 173 Iowa 264, 155 N. W. 267 (1915); Herring v.
Herring, 187 Iowa 593, 174 N. W. 364 (1919). See also Gilpin v. Holingsworth,
3 Md. 190, 56 Am. Dec. 737 (1852); Post v. Jackson, 70 Conn. 283,
39 Atl. 151 (1898); Davidson v. Koehler, 76 Ind. 398 (1881).
DAKOTA LAW REVIEW
husband's realty, regardless of his debts, the provision in the will is not
identical with the statutory provision, and consequently the devise
does not lapse. The court ruled with the defendant, the devise was
upheld, and the "stranger" took his mother's share under the statute.3
But the distributive share of personal property to which the wife
is entitled, under the Iowa law, is exactly in accord with the directions
in the will. The wife is entitled to one-third, after all testator's debts
are paid. Attorneys for plaintiffs urged upon the court that, since the
will imperatively demanded the conversion of all deceased's property
into personality, the will should be treated as one disposing entirely of
personalty. If this were done, the case would fall within the rule that
the devise lapses when the devise and statutory provisions are the same.
The court, however, takes the other view. The whole opinion
hangs upon the proposition that the mental or equitable conversion by
the testator was insufficient to bring the case within the above mentioned
rule. Thus the court argues: "It is doubtless true that the provisions
of the will worked an equitable conversion of the real estate owned by
the testator at the time of his death in so far as it was within his
power to work such conversion. But he had no power to work such
conversion as against his surviving wife. The very provision of the
will which purported to work such equitable conversion was an in-
vasion of the right of distributive share in kind rather than a recognition
of it. This of itself destroyed the identity claimed as between testa-
mentary and statutory provision. We have no need to pursue the
discussion further. " 4
Now the facts in this case stipulate that the wife was dead when
the testator died. The facts should not be ignored. In view of this
situation, then, it is submitted that the construction of this will is made
as of some time prior to the wife's death, otherwise there is no
obstacle to the theory of equitable conversion, for the wife had been
dead several months when the testator died. But the general rule is
that when the will, as here, contains unequivocal directions to convert,
the property is to be regarded as converted as of the time of the
testator's death.5 The Iowa cases are in accord with this prevailing rule,
and yet to deny the application of equitable conversion, the Iowa court
is here insisting upon constducting the will as of some time prior to the
wife's death, it is not clear just-when.
But there is still another peculiar phase to the situation. If the
court is actually construing this will as of some time prior to the wife's
death, and determining its effect at that time, it would seem clear
that it is bound in logic to carry out the construction as of that same
time, in order to determine the rights of the parties under the will.
Equitable conversion is expressly denied in the opinion, because the
testator could not work such conversion. as against his surviving wife.
This alters the actual facts of the case and sets up a hypothetical case,
namely, the situation of the wife surviving the testator. But it will be
noticed that under the will, the wife is entitled to less than she would
take under the law. The testator obviously intended that she should
3In re Davis' Estate, 213 N. W. 395 (1927)41bid. 3965Dever v. Turner, 200 Iowa 926, 205 N. W. 755 (1925); Re-Sargent's Estate,
215 App. Div. 639, 214 N. Y. S. 479 (1926); Baker v. Commissioner etc.,
253 Mass. 130, 148 N. E. 593 (1925); Westfield Trust Co. v. Beekman, 97
N. J. Eq. 140, 128 At. 791 (1925).
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take exactly what the law would allow, but this, in fact, he could not
bring about because now the wife survives him. As a matter of law,
the wife's rights are substantially greater under her distributive share,
for the husband might owe more than the value of his real estate, in
which case she would take nothing under the will.
Now under such a situation, the court's hypothetical case-not the
actual facts in the case-the wife must elect.6  Earlier Iowa cases held
that if she failed to elect, she would be deemed to have elected to take
her distributive share and to have waived her rights under the law.7
Only by statute was this rule changed in Iowa," and in case of failure
to elect she is conclusively presumed to take under the will. But this
would only be a case for the application of this presumption, if it be
presumed further that the wife would refuse to elect to take her dis-
tributive share, when that share is substantially larger than what the
will affords her. The reasonable assumption is that she would elect to
take under the law, in which case, of course, the devise would lapse
and defendant in this case would have no claim upon the estate-
To avoid imputing such an unreasonable and unlikely election to
the wife, it appears that the court has construed the will, so far as
permitting defendant to claim under the Iowa statute is concerned, as
of the time of testator's death when no election is necessary because
the wife is already dead. But this is inconsistent with what the court
has done when denying the theory of equitable conversion in this case.
The hypothetical situation is abandoned and the court reverts to the
actual facts, and by the facts the wife died first. It seems that the
court is trying to eat its cake and save it at the same time, which is
difficult to do. It adopts one theory to exclude the application of
equitable conversion while resorting to another in ordef to permit de-
fendant to take under the Iowa Code. Otherwise the cour is confronted
with the insufferable assumption that the wife is to be deemed to have
refused to take under the law, when her rights were substantially greater
under the law than under the will.
FowLER V. HARPER.
RIGHTS OF SUBROGEE OF FIRST MORTGAGE
The defendant K arranged with the plaintiff Loan Company to
float a bond issue of $10,000 secured by a third mortgage executed on
1400 acres of land, with the understanding that the first and second
mortgages thereon should be discharged either from the proceeds of
the loan or by K from other sources. In pursuance with this agree-
ment, the plaintiffs paid, together with other incumbrances, the first
mortgage of $1800, and charged the payment against K on account of
the loan, rendering a statement to K showing the first mortgage as paid,
but not recording a satisfaction thereof. The loan was insufficient to
pay the second mortgage of $2000 to N on part of the land, and K
failed to pay it from other sources. The plaintiffs had given N to
understand that he had no cause to worry, inasmuch as the first
mortgage was paid. Relying on this representation, N foreclosed and
bought in the land at sheriff's sale in full satisfaction of the amount of
his claim at a time when K was solvent. The plaintiffs then procured
0 CODE, 1924, 12007.
7Everett v. Croskey, 92 Iowa 333, 60 N. W. 732 (1894).
SCODE, 1924, 12010.
